AI Skill Report Card

Threat Modeling Features

B+78·Mar 24, 2026·Source: Web
YAML
--- name: threat-modeling-features description: Creates focused threat models for software features using STRIDE methodology. Use when analyzing security risks for new features, APIs, or system components. ---

Feature Threat Modeling

15 / 15

Input: "User registration API that accepts email, password, stores in database"

Output:

THREAT MODEL: User Registration API

TRUST BOUNDARIES:
- Client ↔ API Server
- API Server ↔ Database

STRIDE ANALYSIS:
[S] Spoofing: Weak password policy, no email verification
[T] Tampering: SQL injection in email field, password storage without hashing
[R] Repudiation: No registration audit logs
[I] Information Disclosure: Error messages leak user existence
[D] Denial of Service: No rate limiting on registration attempts
[E] Elevation of Privilege: Default user roles not restricted

TOP 3 RISKS:
1. HIGH: SQL injection → Database compromise
2. MEDIUM: Weak passwords → Account takeover
3. MEDIUM: No rate limiting → Resource exhaustion

MITIGATIONS:
- Input validation and parameterized queries
- Strong password policy + hashing (bcrypt/Argon2)
- Rate limiting (5 attempts/minute per IP)
Recommendation
Streamline the workflow section - the checklist and step explanations are somewhat redundant
13 / 15

Progress:

  • Map data flow and trust boundaries
  • Apply STRIDE to each boundary crossing
  • Prioritize threats by likelihood × impact
  • Define specific mitigations
  • Review against OWASP Top 10

Step 1: Parse Feature Scope Extract: data types, user roles, external dependencies, storage

Step 2: Identify Trust Boundaries Map where data crosses security contexts (user→app, app→database, app→external service)

Step 3: Apply STRIDE Framework For each boundary:

  • Spoofing: Can attacker impersonate legitimate entity?
  • Tampering: Can data be modified maliciously?
  • Repudiation: Can actions be denied later?
  • Information Disclosure: Can sensitive data leak?
  • Denial of Service: Can availability be impacted?
  • Elevation of Privilege: Can permissions be bypassed?

Step 4: Risk Prioritization

  • HIGH: Easy to exploit + severe impact
  • MEDIUM: Moderate effort or impact
  • LOW: Difficult to exploit + minimal impact
Recommendation
Add a template or framework section with a reusable threat model format
18 / 20

Example 1: Input: File upload endpoint for profile pictures Output:

BOUNDARIES: Client → Upload Handler → File Storage
THREATS:
[T] Malicious file upload (executable disguised as image)
[D] Large file DOS attack
[I] Directory traversal in filename
MITIGATIONS: File type validation, size limits, sandboxed storage

Example 2: Input: Payment processing integration with Stripe Output:

BOUNDARIES: Frontend → Backend → Stripe API
THREATS:
[S] API key exposure in client code
[T] Amount manipulation before Stripe call
[I] Payment data logged in plaintext
MITIGATIONS: Server-side validation, PCI-compliant logging, key rotation
Recommendation
Include more edge cases like mobile apps, microservices, or third-party integrations in examples
  • Stay feature-focused - Don't model the entire system
  • Use concrete examples - "Admin can delete any user account" not "privilege escalation"
  • Prioritize ruthlessly - Highlight top 3-5 risks max
  • Include quick wins - Balance high-impact items with easy fixes
  • Reference standards - OWASP Top 10, CWE categories when relevant
  • Boilerplate threats - Generic "SQL injection possible" without context
  • Missing trust boundaries - Not identifying where data changes security context
  • Analysis paralysis - Modeling every theoretical risk instead of likely ones
  • Solution-first thinking - Jumping to mitigations before understanding threats
  • Ignoring business context - Technical risks without considering actual usage patterns
0
Grade B+AI Skill Framework
Scorecard
Criteria Breakdown
Quick Start
15/15
Workflow
13/15
Examples
18/20
Completeness
15/20
Format
15/15
Conciseness
12/15